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TRIPS AND BITS:  AN ESSAY ON COMPULSORY LICENSES, 
EXPROPRIATION, AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
Peter B. Rutledge* 
 
In the early 1980s, the World Bank forecast that more than 1.2 
million people in Brazil would contract the HIV virus by 2000.1  
That catastrophe did not come to pass, due largely to an aggressive 
anti-AIDS campaign launched by the Brazilian government. 2  
Brazil’s strategy contained a variety of elements, including public 
education, aggressive promotion of contraceptive, needle-exchange 
programs, and, most relevant for this article, the low-cost or free 
provision of antiretroviral drugs to affected populations.3  A key 
element to this strategy was aggressive negotiation over the price 
of medication used to treat patients suffering from HIV and AIDS.4 
When the Brazilian government was unable to reach consensus 
with Merck over the price for Efavirenz, a patented-HIV treatment 
drug, it issued a compulsory license.5  The license allowed Brazil 
to manufacture or import a generic version of the drug.6  Brazil’s 
                                                            
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  Thanks to 
Christopher Smith and Juliane Thon, students at the University of Georgia Law 
School, for exceptional research assistance. 
1  See Aids:  The World Bank’s Partnership with Brazil, WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/UNVP29TDE0 (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
2 See Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques et al., Brazil’s AIDS Controversy:  
Antroretroviral Drugs, Breaking Patents and Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 471, 471 (2005). 
3 See Aids:  The World Bank’s Partnership with Brazil, supra note 1. 
4 Marques, supra note 2, at 472. 
5 For the role of compulsory licenses as a development strategy, see generally 
Rosa Castro Bernieri, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 548 (2006), Laura Chung, Use 
of Paragraph 6 System for Access to Medicine, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
137 (2010), and Ronald T. Corbett, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual 
Property Rights in Developing Countries, 35 INT’L LAW 1083 (2001).   
6 Jon Matthews, Renewing Healthy Competition:  Compulsory Licenses and 
Why Abuses of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards are Most Damaging to the 
United States Healthcare Industry, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 119, 134–
35 (2010).   
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strategy put it at loggerheads with Merck and other private 
companies whose products were essential to treating the Brazilian 
populace.  It also sparked controversy in its diplomatic relations 
with the United States.  Merck responded by accusing Brazil of 
engaging in an “expropriation of intellectual property.” 7   The 
United States Trade Representative placed Brazil on its “priority 
watch list.”8   
Through an agreement later negotiated between the parties, 
Merck was supposed to receive a 1.5% royalty fee as 
remuneration.  When Brazil ordered Merck to transfer all technical 
documents necessary for the production process, the company 
provided only the corresponding patent. 9   Farmanguinhos, a 
Brazilian entity that was to produce the generic brand, could not do 
so with the patent documentation provided and consequently had 
to import small quantities of Efavirenz from India.10  Merck filed a 
preliminary injunction in a Brazilian court to stop the importation, 
but the court refused the request. 11   Brazil later had difficulty 
developing the local manufacturing processes of production for 
Efavirenz. 12   A program of government assistance accelerated 
production, and the drug came to market in 2009.13  The price of 
Efavirenz declined by 93%. 14   Previously, Efavirenz was 
approximately 12% of the cost of the Brazilian Government’s 
expenditures for antiretroviral drugs, but after 2009 the cost 
dropped to 3.9%.15   
                                                            
7  See Ed Silverman, Brazil Breaks Merck Patent On AIDS Drug, Which 
Country Is Next?, PHARMALOT (May 4, 2007, 11:30 AM), http://www. 
pharmalot.com/2007/05/brazil_to_merck_you_cant_thai/. 
8 Matthews, supra note 6, at 135. 
9  Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz in Brazil, ACCESS TO 
PHARMACEUTICALS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.accessto pharmaceuticals.org/ 
case-studies-in-global-health/efavirenz-brazil/. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See Brazil to Produce Generic Version of Merck’s Antiretroviral Efavirenz, 
EUR. AIDS TREATMENT GROUP (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.eatg.org/eatg/ 
Global-HIV-News/Access-to-treatment/Brazil-to-produce-generic-version-of-
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The dispute between Brazil and Merck sparked an important 
debate lying at the intersection of intellectual property law and 
international investment law. 16   Do such compulsory licenses 
actually violate developing countries’ treaty obligations?  The 
relevant literature points to provisions in bilateral investment 
treaties and free trade agreements that protect “investments” 
(defined broadly enough to include patents) and prohibit the 
“expropriation” (whether direct or indirect) of that investment.17  
Applied in the context of a situation such as the Brazil/Merck 
dispute, this literature argues that certain compulsory licenses 
could, under some circumstances, constitute an indirect 
“expropriation” of investments based on a company’s patent and, 
thereby, entitle the company to compensation.  If accepted, the 
“indirect expropriation” theory has the potential to recalibrate 
significantly the parties’ bargaining positions in settings such as 
the Brazil/Merck conflict. 
The stakes in such disputes are enormous and cut across 
countries and industries.  Similar disputes have arisen in other 
countries such as Ecuador and Thailand.18  Moreover, putting the 
pharmaceutical industry to one side, at a higher level of abstraction 
                                                                                                                                     
Merck-s-antiretroviral-efavirenz; Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz in Brazil, 
supra note 9. 
16 See HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights 
Under BITs, FTAs, and TRIPS:  Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence?, in 
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 485, 495 (Chester 
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011). 
17 See generally Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and 
Free Trade Agreements:  Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 
26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331 (2004); Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory 
License in Investment Arbitration:  The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 357 (2010); Tsai-Yu Lin, Compulsory Licenses for Access to 
Medicines, Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral 
Investment Agreements—Are There Issues Beyond the TRIPS Agreements?, 40 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 152 (2009).  For a thorough 
discussion of regulatory expropriation in investment law, see Andrew 
Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 
20 ICSID REV. 1 (2005).   
18 See Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years:  Success or Failure, as 
Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 387–90 (2011); 
Matthews, supra note 6, at 134–37. 
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such cases involve a potential collision of interests between the 
profit-making motives of private companies and the development 
goals of foreign nations.  Balancing the rights too heavily in favor 
of the private company may cripple a nation financially in an effort 
to avert a public health disaster.  Balancing the rights too heavily 
in favor of the host nation may advance the public health goals of 
the developing country but at a potentially steep cost.  Not only do 
they alienate the property rights of the investor, but they can also 
discourage future private investment due to concerns over the 
stability of property rights in the host country. 
The substantive dispute—and the underlying stakes—raise 
separate, but no less important questions over precisely how, if at 
all, these claims will be adjudicated.  Hometown justice concerns, 
sovereign immunity doctrines, judicial backlogs and jurisdictional 
limitations all may limit resort to national courts to resolve such 
disputes.19  Given these limitations, arbitration emerges as a viable 
alternative forum in which to examine these issues. 
Such arbitrations can take one of two forms.  In the first form, 
arbitration can take place under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization.  The World Trade Organization administers the 
TRIPS agreement, regulating the use of compulsory licenses of 
patented goods by WTO members.  In state-state arbitration, a 
WTO arbitration panel can determine whether the compulsory 
license is TRIPS-compliant.20  In the second form, arbitration can 
take place under the auspices of an investment arbitral tribunal 
convened pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty.  In an investor-
state arbitration, the tribunal can determine whether the 
compulsory license constitutes an “indirect expropriation” and, if 
so, award the investor damages. 
This essay examines the potential for arbitration to resolve 
these disputes between private companies and developing 
countries over the propriety of compulsory licenses.  At bottom, 
                                                            
19  See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 3 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing the 
difficulties of suing foreign sovereigns). 
20 Recent changes to the United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
discussed below, complicate this strategy. 
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my thesis is that arbitration supplies the medium through which to 
mediate the tension between the profit-seeking goals of private 
multinational companies and the development goals of foreign 
nations, especially in the developing world.  The compulsory 
license debate raises a clash of fundamental interests between the 
patent holder, the patent holder’s state, and the host state.  
Arbitration can play an important role in balancing those interests, 
albeit a highly unusual one.  Arbitration provides an essential 
forum through which to test the legality of a state’s compulsory 
license.  This is particularly important where the patent holder 
cannot rely upon its own nation-state adequately to vindicate its 
interests.  Despite the potential importance of arbitration in this 
context, patent holders curiously have not actually pursued this 
form of dispute resolution.  Nonetheless, this does not render 
arbitration unimportant.  Rather, it becomes an important 
background vehicle against which nation-states and patent holders 
can strike the bargains necessary to balance their respective 
interests in the development and exploitation of inventions such as 
pharmaceuticals in the context of a public health crisis. 
The debates over compulsory licensing and indirect 
expropriation lie at the intersection of two areas of law—
intellectual property law and international investment law.  Both 
areas of law rest on a common premise.  They attempt to create the 
legal conditions under which private companies are encouraged to 
invest in a manner that simultaneously benefits the company and 
the state.21  Both areas of law, though, raise important questions 
about how exactly the rights of the property holder will be 
protected and how the legality of the state’s conduct will be tested. 
Begin with patent law.  Scholars have long understood the 
importance of patents to industry, innovation, and economic 
growth.22   By granting inventors a temporary monopoly on the 
                                                            
21 See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing 
on Foreign Direct Investment:  A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. 
L. J. 283, 299–300 (2008); Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: “Adequate 
Remuneration” for Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 
947–50 (2008). 
22  John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of The 
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002). 
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exploitation of their inventions, patents encourage investment in 
the research and development essential to promoting progress and 
advancing the public good, whether in the field of pharmaceuticals, 
computers, or something else.  Thus, to the extent a patent 
facilitates the development of a prescription drug, society benefits 
when that drug comes to market and, thereby, addresses a public 
health concern.  While that temporary monopoly is important, it is 
not limitless.  Nor should it be.  Limits on the duration and scope 
of patents ensure that the holder of the monopoly neither stifles 
innovation nor deprives the public of the benefits to be had from 
the invention.23 
This simple account assumes a monopolar world—that is, a 
world with a single sovereign setting forth a set of unified property 
rights for a single society.  Of course, as numerous scholars have 
noted, patents operate in a multi-polar setting.24  That is, while the 
patent may be issued by an individual nation-state, the invention 
potentially may be exploited in multiple nations. 
This multi-polar setting raises distinct challenges.  On the one 
hand, it raises distributional concerns.  If property rights secured 
by a patent are immediately subject to recognition in other nations, 
such a regime locks in the first-mover advantage of the first nation 
and the first inventor.  On the other hand, it risks undercutting the 
benefits of patents described in the simple model above.  A patent 
may well lose some of its utility of the invention and simply be 
reverse-engineered in another country not obligated to respect the 
patent rights of the original inventor. 
In this multi-polar setting, international treaties are used to 
attempt to balance these competing concerns.  Currently, the 
dominant regime is the TRIPS Agreement.25  TRIPS came into 
                                                            
23 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 999 (1997). 
24  Kali Murray & Esther van Zimmeren, Dynamic Patent Governance in 
Europe and the United States:  The Myriad Example, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 287, 293 (2011). 
25 For exemplary literature on TRIPS, see Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-
Plus Agreements:  The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 1023 (2009); Jean F. Morin, Multilateralizing TRIPs-Plus Agreements:  
Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009); Henning 
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effect on January 1, 1995, after the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
and created a minimum standard of intellectual property 
protection.26  Its provisions can be divided into three broad areas:   
standards of protection, domestic enforcement procedures and 
remedies, and dispute settlement at the WTO.27  Obligations under 
the Agreement apply equally to all member states, although 
developing countries have a longer time to phase in the 
provisions.28 
Among the important issues addressed by TRIPS is the 
relationship between the patent holders’ rights and the public 
health needs of a TRIPS member-state.  Article 31 of TRIPS 
attempts to address this issue through a careful balance of the 
respective parties’ competing interests.29  On the one hand, Article 
31 of TRIPS contemplates the possibility that a state could issue a 
compulsory license for such patented material. 30   On the other 
hand, Article 31 also specifies various conditions for the license.  
Among other considerations:   
• Each license “shall be considered on its individual 
merits” 
• The license can be issued only after an effort had been 
made by the government to gain authorization from the 
                                                                                                                                     
G. Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and Subsequent 
TRIPS-PLUS Free Trade Agreements:  Towards Safeguarding TRIPS 
Flexibilities, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325 (2011); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was 
Never Enough:  Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 447 (2011). 
26 Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs:  Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 791 (2001); Overview:  The TRIPS Agreement, 
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 
29, 2012). 
27 Drahos, supra note 26, at 791; Overview:  The TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 26. 
28 Drahos, supra note 26, at 791; Overview:  The TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 26. 
29  Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
30 Id. 
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rights holder “on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions” 
• The license must be non-exclusive and non-assignable, 
with a “scope and duration . . . limited to the purpose 
for which it was authorized” 
• The license must be used “predominantly for the supply 
of the domestic market”31 
• There must be “adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the 
economic value of the authorization”32   
This scheme raises an obvious question:  how exactly is one to test 
whether a compulsory license comports with Article 31?33 
The answer to this question is critical.  The Brazil/Merck 
debate might well be a close case subject to reasonable views on 
either side.  But what if a country relied on Brazil’s logic to issue a 
compulsory license in a setting where the public health concerns 
were not as compelling?  For example, Thailand issued a 
compulsory license for Plavix, a drug used to treat a chronic (rather 
than infectious) disease.34  The noninfectious nature of the health 
problem diminished the claim for the license’s necessity. 
To resolve such disputes over whether a nation’s conduct 
comports with TRIPS, the treaty employs the espousal model 
                                                            
31 Changes to Article 31 waive this requirement.  See note 33 infra (discussing 
Article 31bis). 
32 TRIPS, supra note 29; Gibson, supra note 17, at 369. 
33 A 2005 protocol amending TRIPS would ease some of the restrictions on 
issuance of compulsory licenses by developing states.  See WTO Amendment of 
the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005) (Article 31bis); Frederick M. 
Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy:  
Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicine Under the 
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 932 (2007); Peter K. Yu, 
The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L. J. 827, 827–86 (2007) 
(tracing history of Article 31bis).  To date, however, an insufficient number of 
WTO member states have ratified the amendment, leaving its status in an 
ongoing legal limbo.  See Yahong Lin, Intellectual Property and Public Health:  
Two Sides of the Same Coin, 6 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 389, 
411–12 (2011). 
34 Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 
42 GA. L. REV. 131, 133 (2007); Matthews, supra note 6, at 136. 
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familiar to scholars of international law.35  Under this model, the 
nation-state of the patent holder asserts a claim against the nation-
state issuing the compulsory license.  To return to the Brazil/Merck 
example, the United States would espouse a claim on behalf of 
Merck.  Currently, such espousal would take place before a dispute 
settlement board of the World Trade Organization. 
As several scholars have noted, espousal offers some 
advantages but also raises important agency problems. 36   The 
primary advantage of espousal arises from the fact that the 
inventor’s nation-state serves as a filter through which any 
potential TRIPS claim must pass.  This ensures that the nation-
state can weigh the domestic political payoff of representing a 
patent holder’s interests against the diplomatic consequences of 
espousing a claim against a foreign nation.  The downside of the 
espousal model (in the context of TRIPS) is that it assumes the 
nation-state will be an effective agent of the patent holder’s 
interests.  But where the nation-state’s interests diverge from those 
of the patent holder, the limits set forth in Article 36 become 
hollow from the patent holder’s perspective. 
Given the agency problems, the patent holder needs some 
alternative recourse.  Litigation options are poor at best.  A suit 
brought against the licensing nation in that nation’s own courts is 
hardly an appealing option.  Under its own domestic law, the 
sovereign may be immune from suit.37  Even if it is not, concerns 
about hometown justice or judicial backlog may discourage the 
patent holder from believing that it can receive a fair hearing.38  
Merck’s failed effort to block Brazil’s import of Efavirenz from 
India illustrates this problem. 
Suit in the patent holder’s home courts might be slightly more 
appealing, but that option, too, raises problems.  Hometown justice 
                                                            
35  Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor 
Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 821–25 (2005). 
36  Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of 
Linking International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 31–
32 (2011). 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). 
38 See Aaron Pereira, Licensing Technology to the BRICs:  The Case for ADR, 
11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 235, 242 (2009). 
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concerns may drop out (and indeed, even work to the patent 
holder’s advantage).  Yet the sovereign immunity rules of the 
home jurisdiction may preclude suit, particularly if they insist upon 
some “nexus” to or “effect” in the forum states, as American 
foreign sovereign immunity law generally does.39  Moreover, given 
the above-described agency problems, the patent holder can hardly 
have assurance that its own government will look favorably upon 
the suit or support it if asked by the local courts.  Finally, 
enforcement and ultimate satisfaction of the judgment may prove 
difficult, either due to domestic restrictions on judgment execution 
against foreign sovereign property or due to the lack of a treaty 
between the judgment-rendering state and the state where the 
offending country has assets.40 
Given the limitations of the espousal regime and garden-variety 
civil litigation, the international investment regime has begun to 
emerge as a potentially viable alternative.  Since the end of the 
Second World War, nations have sought to create the legal 
conditions necessary to facilitate cross-border direct investment.41  
The primary model for doing so has been the development of 
bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”).42  To facilitate investments, 
BITs extend various rights to the investor such as the right to fair 
and equitable treatment or, relevant for our purposes, the right to 
compensation in case of an expropriation of the investment. 43  
More importantly for our purposes, while investment claims were 
at one time subject to the espousal regime, BITs now typically 
allow the investor to commence arbitration proceedings directly 
against the host state.44 
                                                            
39 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 19, at ch. 3. 
40 Id. chs. 3,12. 
41 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?:  An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 67, 68–71 (2005). 
42  Reliance estimates suggest that approximately 2900 such treaties are 
presently in force, and the United States is party to forty such treaties.  Id. at 72–
73. 
43 See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, Foreword:  Symposium:  Romancing the 
Foreign Investor BIT by BIT, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005). 
44 Id. 
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Seen through this lens, arbitration pursuant to BITs potentially 
solves the agency problems created by the espousal model and 
addresses some of the shortcomings of litigation alternatives.  
Unlike the espousal model, the investor does not have to depend on 
a nation-state either to advance its interests or, indeed, approve the 
claim.  Compared to litigation, BIT arbitration also avoids the 
sovereign immunity concerns.  It also can surmount the 
enforceability problem.  Awards in BIT arbitrations are subject to a 
very favorable pro-enforcement regime; by contrast, the lack of a 
multilateral, or even bilateral, treaty between the United States and 
a foreign country makes a comparable judgment made in domestic 
litigation far harder to enforce.45 
While BITs became a potential solution to the limitations of the 
espousal regime under TRIPS, their effectiveness depends on the 
answer to an important substantive question:  what is the 
relationship between compulsory licenses under TRIPS and the 
protection against expropriation under BITs? 46   Is a TRIPS-
compliant compulsory license automatically not an indirect 
expropriation under a BIT?  Conversely, if a compulsory license is 
not TRIPS compliant, is it automatically an expropriation?47  Or, 
for those BITs lacking a provision like Annex B, is there some 
“space” between a TRIPS-non-compliant license and a full-blown 
expropriation? 
The response to these questions has evolved.  Early versions of 
BITs did not address the issue at all. 48   More recent versions, 
exemplified by the United States-Uruguay BIT, follow a different 
course.49  They define an indirect expropriation by reference to 
                                                            
45 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 19, at 1080.  
46 See Jan Paulsson & Zachary Douglas, Indirect Expropriation in Investment 
Treaty Arbitrations, in 19 ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES:  
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 145, 148 (Norbert Horn ed., 
Kluwer Law International 2004); Correa, supra note 17, at 335; Gibson, supra 
note 17, at 373; Lin, supra note 17, at 153.  
47 Correa, supra note 17, at 373. 
48 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fed. Republic of 
Ger.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 6575. 
49  Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, U.S.-Uru., Annex B, P 4(a), Nov. 4, 2005 [hereinafter U.S.-
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several criteria including 1) the magnitude of the interference with 
property rights, 2) whether that interference rises to the level of 
expropriation as referenced in the treaty, and 3) character and 
motive behind the regulatory government action. 50   Moreover, 
Annex B to the U.S. Model BIT now provides “[e]xcept in rare 
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party.”51   
These evolutions in the US Model BIT alter, but hardly eliminate, 
the ongoing debates over whether (and to what extent) compulsory 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment do 
not constitute indirect expropriations.”52  This evolution simplifies 
but does not eliminate the debate.  What are the “rare 
circumstances”?53  How is a regulation tested whether it is “non-
discriminator” and is “designed and applied to protect legitimate 
public welfare objectives”?54 
These are difficult substantive questions, and the answer is 
unclear.  My point, though, is not to resolve definitively the 
relationship between the substantive standards.  Rather, it is to 
illustrate how the direct-action model of investment arbitration 
serves as an important vehicle by which to test the answers to these 
questions.  Such a vehicle becomes particularly important where 
there is reason to doubt an alignment between the interests of the 
patent holder and the interests of his home jurisdiction.  The 
evolution in the United States’ position on the model BIT 
exemplifies how such risks can arise.  The United States may be 
especially reluctant to espouse a challenge to a compulsory license 
based on an indirect expropriation theory precisely because it 
                                                                                                                                     
Uruguay BIT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/ 
agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file566_15163.pdf. 
50 Gibson, supra note 17, at 389. 
51 Compare U.S. MODEL BIT ANNEX B (1984), with U.S. MODEL BIT ANNEX 
B (2004), available at www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv1/groups/public/@nyu_law_ 
website__faculty__faculty_profiles__jalvarez/documents/documents/ecm_pro_0
66871.pdf. 
52 U.S. MODEL BIT ANNEX B (2004).  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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wishes to preserve for itself just such a power (whether exercised 
against the patent holder or in another context). 
Given the potential of investment arbitration to address the 
agency problems, one would expect to see a proliferation of such 
arbitrations in response to compulsory license cases.  Over the last 
two decades, the number of BIT arbitrations has skyrocketed.55  
Indirect expropriation claims have become an increasingly popular 
theory to advance in such arbitrations.56  And the litigious rhetoric 
of Merck and other companies reacting to compulsory licenses 
suggests that they are prepared to pick this fight. 
Despite the ripeness of the conditions, however, something 
remarkable has occurred (or, to put the point more precisely, has 
not occurred).  There does not appear to be any reported instance 
of a BIT arbitration filed (much less decided) on the basis of a 
claim that a compulsory license constituted an indirect 
expropriation.  Despite an extensive secondary literature on the 
topic, none of that literature refers to an actual case, and my own 
research has not uncovered one.  Why should this be so? 
Several hypotheses are possible, the verification of which must 
be the subject for another paper.  One possibility is that we may 
not know about them.  While many investment arbitrations, such as 
those conducted under the auspices of ICSID or NAFTA, are 
generally subject to public disclosure, others are not. 57   Some 
investment arbitrations are conducted on an ad hoc basis under the 
UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Rules, and others are conducted 
pursuant to the rules of a regional arbitral center such as the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.  Arbitration subject to these 
sorts of rules are not subject to disclosure obligations, and indeed 
some evidence suggests that, in a few cases, parties prefer the 
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56  Eric Gillman, Note, Legal Transplants in Trade and Investment 
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anonymity of these systems for resolving their disputes.58   The 
problem with the confidentiality explanation is simply the 
difficulty of preserving it over the long-term.  News of arbitration 
leaks, whether prompted by the parties, unearthed by watchdogs, 
or eventually reported in secondary literature.   
Confidentiality is not the only possible explanation.  Another 
might be a basic lack of confidence in the merits of the argument.  
Despite the fiery rhetoric of Merck’s officers and the articulate 
musings of scholars and seasoned practitioners, the investors may 
at the end of the day doubt whether they would win.  The shift in 
the United States’ position on the relationship between TRIPS 
compliance and indirect expropriation may send a signal that the 
government does not buy the argument.  Here too, that hypothesis 
seems incomplete.  Even if certain compulsory licenses do not 
constitute indirect expropriations (as the US/Uruguay BIT 
suggests),59 that position still subjects the compulsory license to a 
set of standards.  Thus, even in those cases where the Uruguay 
standard applies, there remains an open question whether a 
nation’s compulsory license satisfies that standard, and nothing 
should preclude an investor from testing that question. 
A third possibility is a subtle variation of the preceding one.  
Perhaps the important fact is not the substance of the United 
States’ position but, rather, the fact that the United States is 
sending it.  The international arbitration bar is a small one, and 
governments are logically the repeat players in such disputes.  
Potential arbitrators may be reluctant to embrace a theory on which 
the government has cast doubts.  Doing so might harm the 
arbitrator’s reputation and, thereby, hamper his or her chances at 
future appointments.  Here too, though, that argument seems a bit 
far-fetched.  Under that logic, arbitrators should be reluctant ever 
to rule against governments in investment arbitrations, yet the 
annals of investment arbitration jurisprudence are filled with 
                                                            
58 See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE HAGUE CONFERENCE 2010:  
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examples of tribunals entering awards—both on jurisdictional and 
substantive matters—adverse to the government parties. 
Whatever the cause, the lack of litigation may ultimately be 
beside the point.  Rather, perhaps the mere threat of litigation is all 
that the company needs.  That threat, if credibly issued, might 
simply enhance the investor’s bargaining position against the 
nation-state and enable the company ultimately to obtain a better 
price for the patented product.  In other words, the possibility of a 
direct investor claim, unencumbered by the espousal process, 
shapes the bargaining in the shadow of international investment 
and intellectual property law.60  
In sum, arbitration plays a critical role in the field of 
international intellectual property.  Where disputes arise between 
an investor and a nation-state over the legality of a compulsory 
license, arbitration can overcome many of the shortcomings of 
other forms of dispute resolution.  Compared to litigation, 
arbitration avoids both doctrinal problems of sovereign immunity 
and tactical problems of hometown justice.  Compared to espousal 
under the TRIPS regime, arbitration serves as backstop in cases 
where the investor’s interests may diverge from those of the 
investor’s state.  Despite its potential as a tool in these disputes, 
arbitration does not appear to have been actually employed.  While 
several hypotheses might be tested to explain this phenomenon, the 
actual explanation may be secondary.  Rather, the central value of 
arbitration comes through the credible threat—and possibility—of 
such a suit.  The sheer possibility helps to protect the investor’s 
interests and to balance the competing values that underpin the 
distribution of intellectual property rights (and resulting benefits) 
in a multipolar world. 
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